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SPECIAL CABLE TO AMERICA'S CITIES!: THE
HOLLOW INTERESTS JUSTIFYING THE
SINGLE FRANCHISE POLICY CANNOT
WITHSTAND FIRST
AMENDMENT CHALLENGE
I. INTRODUCTION
In most United States cities, cable television ("CTV") broadcasting
is offered to consumers by a monopoly franchise. This stems from mu-
nicipal governments' adoption of a "single franchise policy," which lim-
its to one, the number of companies given access to build CTV systems.
The single franchise policy has proven detrimental to CTV companies
and consumers alike. CTV companies cannot expand into new munici-
pal markets and dissatisfied consumers are left without alternatives when
looking for new CTV service.
In Group W Cable, Inc. v. City of Santa Cruz, I ("Group W") the
Northern District Court of California heard competing arguments re-
garding the validity of the single franchise policy. Group W Cable Com-
pany charged that Santa Cruz's single franchise policy was an
unconstitutional abridgment of its first amendment freedoms of speech
and of the press. Santa Cruz justified its single franchise policy as neces-
sary to protect important governmental interests which flow from CTV
broadcasting.
The Group W court held that Santa Cruz's single franchise policy
abridged Group W's first amendment rights.2 While some federal courts
have reached the same conclusion as the Group W court,3 others have,
upheld the single franchise policy as a constitutionally valid restriction
on speech.4 With conflict among the circuits, the exclusive franchising
issue faced by the Group W court will find its ultimate resolution in the
United States Supreme Court. The Court has a responsibility to articu-
late a first amendment standard for CTV broadcasting that will lead the
industry into the twenty-first century. If CTV is not properly protected
1. 669 F. Supp. 954 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
2. Id. at 975.
3. Pacific West Cable Company v. City of Sacramento, 672 F. Supp. 1322 (E.D. Cal.
1987); Century Federal, Inc. v. City of Palo Alto, 648 F. Supp. 1465 (N.D. Cal. 1986).
4. See, e.g., Central Telecommunications, Inc. v. TCI Cablevision, Inc., 800 F.2d 711
(8th Cir. 1986).
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as a first amendment speaker, the unique and promising medium may be
crippled with respect to future expansion of its communication niche.
This casenote presents the conflicting arguments about the exclusiv-
ity of CTV franchising within the framework of the Group W case. A
reasonable constitutional solution is suggested so that both a city's and a
CTV operator's interests are equally protected.
II. STATEMENT OF FACTS
In the city of Santa Cruz, Group W and its predecessor operated a
monopoly CTV franchise since 1966.' When Group W and Santa Cruz
could not reach an agreement for renewal of the City's CTV franchise,
offers to provide service to the Santa Cruz area were solicited from other
CTV operators.6 Santa Cruz received four proposals, including one from
Group W.7
In September, 1986, Santa Cruz denied Group W a renewal of its
existing franchise and refused to grant it a new one.8 Group W then
brought suit in the Northern District Court of California to enjoin the
City and County of Santa Cruz from terminating its CTV franchise.9
The court granted summary judgment for Group W, holding that Santa
Cruz's single franchise policy violated Group W's first amendment pro-
tections of free speech and press.' 0
The prevailing issue in Group W was what degree of first amend-
ment protection CTV should be afforded. The Supreme Court has held
that "each medium of expression ... must be assessed for First Amend-
ment purposes by standards suited to it, for each may present its own
problems."'" "In assessing First Amendment claims concerning cable
access, the Court must determine whether the characteristics of CTV
make it sufficiently analogous to another medium to warrant application
of an already existing standard or whether those characteristics require a
new analysis."' 
2
Group W argued that CTV operated analogously to a newspaper
and therefore deserved the same broad constitutional protections a news-
5. Group W, 669 F. Supp. at 956.
6. Id. at 957.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Group W, 669 F. Supp. at 967.
11. Southeastern Promotions Limited v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 557 (1975). A first amend-
ment standard for the FAX machine needs articulation someday.
12. Central Telecommunications v. TCI Cablevision, 800 F.2d 711, 715 (8th Cir. 1986).
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paper is afforded.' 3 Group W asserted, therefore, that the holding in
Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo4 ("Miami Herald") should free
CTV of governmental regulation.
In Miami Herald, the Supreme Court addressed the constitutional-
ity of a Florida statute which required newspapers to grant free reply
space to political candidates who were criticized in the papers' col-
umns.' 5 The Court struck down the statute, holding that government
could not regulate the exercise of editorial discretion in the newspaper
business consistent with first amendment guarantees of a free press. ,6
Miami Herald established that newspaper publishers have the right to
choose what to print in their columns without governmental interference.
Group W asserted that since governments are forbidden from regulating
which newspapers are permitted entry into their markets and what edito-
rial content they may contain, CTV should also be free from the same
governmental restrictions.
The City of Santa Cruz asserted that it had substantial or important
governmental interests in limiting access to only one CTV company.
Santa Cruz justified the single franchise policy as necessary to protect
against: (1) scarcity of an economic marketplace capable of supporting
more than one CTV company's profitability ("economic scarcity" or
"natural monopoly"); (2) scarcity of physical space for cable wires on
utility poles and in underground conduits to accomodate more than one
CTV company's cable wire ("physical scarcity"); and (3) undue physical
disruption to the public domain caused by installing more than one CTV
system over public rights-of-way ("physical disruption").' 7
Arguing for a restrictive first amendment standard, Santa Cruz as-
serted that CTV broadcasting should be treated as analogous to radio
and television broadcasting, because the physical and economic scarcity
aspects of CTV closely resemble the scarcity aspects of a broadcaster. 8
Santa Cruz asserted that CTV should be subject to the Supreme Court's
holding in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. United States 9 ("Red Lion").
Red Lion established legal authority for regulation of broadcasting by
government.
The Supreme Court in Red Lion was confronted with a Federal
Communications Commission ("FCC") regulation, similar to the Florida
13. Group W, 669 F. Supp. at 961.
14. 418 U.S. 241 (1974).
15. Id. at 243.
16. Id. at 258.
17. Group W. 669 F. Supp. at 961-62.
18. Id. at 960-61.
19. 395 U.S. 367 (1969).
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statute in Miami Herald. The FCC regulation required broadcasters to
allow reply time to people who were criticized over their airwaves (the
"Fairness Doctrine"). The Red Lion Court upheld the FCC's Fairness
Doctrine, recognizing that greater governmental intrusion into the
broadcast media (i.e., radio and television) is allowed because of the
physical scarcity of radiowaves.2°
Thus, in the broadcasting business, because the electromagnetic ra-
dio spectrum is limited to a finite number of channels, government must
regulate who is given the opportunity to broadcast over them.2" The Red
Lion case stands for the general proposition that the award of a broadcast
license may be subjected to reasonable regulations by government if the
regulations are aimed at goals other than the suppression of ideas.22
Under Red Lion, Santa Cruz believed it had the authority to regulate the
number of CTV broadcasters in much the same way wireless broadcast-
ers are regulated.23
III. THE GROUP W COURT'S REASONING
The Group W court concluded that "unless cable television differs in
some material respect from the print media, the First Amendment stan-
dards that apply to newspapers apply with equal force to cable."24 The
court went on to state that "there is no doubt that the government would
be prohibited under the First Amendment from decreeing that a newspa-
per is barred from publishing and disseminating information in a specific
community.
25
The Group W court, however, did not end its constitutional analysis
with the analogy of CTV to newspapers. In first amendment jurispru-
dence, it is recognized that "the mere fact that a regulation imposes a
limitation on constitutionally protected speech does not mean the regula-
tion is invalid; the question is whether the regulation represents a consti-
tutionally permissible restriction on speech."' 26  The Group W court
continued its analysis, therefore, to determine whether the single
20. Id. at 390. "Because of the scarcity of radio frequencies, the Government is permitted
to put restraints on licensees in favor of others whose views should be expressed on this unique
medium." Id.
21. Preferred Communications v. City of Los Angeles, 754 F.2d 1396, 1403 (9th Cir.
1985) aff'd, 476 U.S. 488 (1986). "[T]he electromagnetic spectrum simply is physically inca-
pable of carrying the messages of all who wish to use the medium." Id.
22. NOWAK, ROTUNDA, YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 894 (1983).
23. Group W, 669 F. Supp. at 961.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 960.
26. Pacific West Cable Co. v. City of Sacramento, 672 F. Supp. 1322, 1331 (E.D. Cal.
1987).
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franchise policy was unrelated to the content or communicative aspect of
Group W's CTV speech.
The court found that Santa Cruz's single franchise policy was di-
rected toward Group W's conduct in building and operating a CTV sys-
tem (e.g., tearing up city streets) and not at the views being expressed
over the broadcast medium." Thus, the Group W court determined that
the single franchise policy was a "content-neutral" regulation of the non-
speech aspects of CTV.28 The issue still remained whether this content-
neutral regulation infringed upon Group W's first amendment rights.
To answer this question, the Group W court applied the content-
neutral balancing test of United States v. O'Brien 29 ("O'Brien") to deter-
mine if Santa Cruz's regulations were constitutional. In the CTV con-
text, the O'Brien test balances a city's interests in preventing more than
one CTV company from receiving a franchise against a CTV operator's
first amendment rights. The O'Brien test states that a government regu-
lation is sufficiently justified:
1. if it is within the constitutional power of the government;
2. if it furthers an important or substantial governmental
interest;
3. if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression
of free expression; and
4. if the incidental restriction on alleged first amendment free-
doms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that
interest.3"
The Group W court held that Santa Cruz satisfied the first prong of
the O'Brien test.3 ' The Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984,32
which established a national policy concerning cable communications,
authorizes local governments to award one or more CTV franchises
within their jurisdictions. Santa Cruz's award of only one CTV
franchise, therefore, was within its constitutional power.
The second prong of O'Brien is whether the single franchise policy
furthers an important or substantial governmental interest. Santa Cruz
asserted three important or substantial governmental interests: (1) eco-
27. Santa Cruz's franchising policy would have been "content-based," for example, if the
City had the discretion to forbid certain programming or dictate that only city-approved shows
would air.
28. Group W, 669 F. Supp. at 962.
29. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
30. Id. at 377.
31. Group W, 669 F. Supp. at 963.
32. 47 U.S.C. § 521 et. seq. (1982).
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nomic scarcity; (2) physical scarcity; and (3) physical disruption.33 For
summary judgment purposes, however, the Group W court held that
Santa Cruz failed to show that these interests in fact existed.
One of Santa Cruz's arguments was that because the City's CTV
market would give rise to a natural or eventual monopoly, there was an
important or substantial governmental interest in choosing the single best
CTV provider at the outset and granting it an exclusive franchise. 34 A
natural monopoly occurs when an economic market clannot support com-
petition in a given business. For example, if a number of CTV companies
set out to build competing systems in the same city, the demand for serv-
ices would be insufficient to keep all operators in business, and only one
would survive economically. This process leads to wasteful duplication
of effort and increased fees to subscribers.3" When an industry is a natu-
ral monopoly, regulation insures reasonable service at a fair rate in the
best interest of the subscribers.36
The Group W court, however, rejected the natural monopoly argu-
ment as justification for granting an exclusive CTV franchise. By analo-
gizing the CTV medium to newspapers, the court followed the reasoning
of Miami Herald. In Miami Herald, the Supreme Court acknowledged
that newspaper publishing may be a monopoly controlled by the owners
of the market,37 however, "it has yet to be demonstrated how govern-
mental regulation of this crucial process can be exercised consistent with
First Amendment guarantees of a free press ... "38 The Court further
stated that a city "may have legitimate interests in matters that concern
it . . . but promoting economic efficiency is not among them."39 The
Group W court held that since CTV was analogous to newspapers, even
if a natural monopoly existed, it was not a sufficient justification for
granting an exclusive franchise.
Santa Cruz also alleged that space on utility poles and under city
streets was physically incapable of handling the four applicants who ap-
plied to enter the market." Of the four CTV franchise applications
Santa Cruz received, however, only two companies sought concurrent
33. Group W, 669 F. Supp. at 961-62.
34. Id. at 964.
35. "Competition may exist for a time but only until bankruptcy or merger leaves the field
to one firm, in a meaningful sense, competition is self-destructive." National Reporting Co. v.
Alderson Reporting Co., 763 F.2d 1020, 1023 (8th Cir. 1985).
36. Group W, 669 F. Supp. at 965.
37. Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 249 (1974).
38. Id. at 258.
39. Group W, 669 F. Supp. at 965.
40. Id. at 966.
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access to the market.4" The other two CTV companies wanted exclusive
franchises free from competition. Because Santa Cruz's declarations
failed to address whether utility pole space could accomodate the two
CTV companies which sought concurrent access, for purposes of sum-
mary judgment, the City failed to raise a triable issue of fact whether
there was scarcity of available space.42
Santa Cruz's final argument was that it had a substantial govern-
mental interest in protecting city residents from the resulting physical
and aesthetic disruption which would occur during installation of more
than one CTV system.43 Santa Cruz offered declarations that the non-
simultaneous installation of four new CTV systems would necessitate
tearing up streets and tampering with utility poles.' The court found,
however, that if Santa Cruz was willing to suffer the disruption of Group
W dismantling its existing system while a second company installed a
new system,45 the resulting disruption could be no worse than if two
companies built new systems simultaneously.46 Thus, for summary judg-
ment purposes, the court held that Santa Cruz failed to raise a triable
issue of fact whether its interest in regulating physical disruption was a
sufficient justification for limiting the City to only one CTV franchise.47
The Group W court concluded that Santa Cruz failed the second
prong of the O'Brien test, because it did not have important or substan-
tial government interests.48 The court rejected Santa Cruz's analogy that
the first amendment standards applicable to broadcast regulation permit
CTV to be regulated in the same way.49 Although the Group W court
agreed with Santa Cruz that the City could not physically support unlim-
ited CTV operators, the court stated that this fact alone did not justify
granting only a single CTV franchise.5" The court held Santa Cruz in
violation of Group W's first amendment rights and permanently enjoined
41. Id.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 966. The court stated: "Santa Cruz also argues that the physical and aesthetic
disruption to the public domain that will necessarily result from the construction of multiple
cable systems justifies granting a single franchise." Id.
44. Group W, 669 F. Supp. at 966.
45. Id. at 967. "It is difficult to perceive the existence of a substantial government interest
in preventing the installation of the second system at the same time Group W's existing cables
are replaced." Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. Since Santa Cruz did not pass the second prong of O'Brien, the court did not
address the third or fourth parts of the test.
49. Group W, 669 F. Supp. at 967.
50. Id.
1990]
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the City from interfering with Group W's Santa Cruz CTV operations.5'
IV. HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE: THE PREFERRED DECISIONS
The same constitutional arguments addressed by the Group W court
reached the United States Supreme Court by way of the Ninth Circuit's
opinion in Preferred Communications, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles52 ("Pre-
ferred I"). In Preferred I, the City of Los Angeles, like Santa Cruz in the
Group W case, contended that economic scarcity, physical scarcity and
physical disruption justified singling out one CTV provider and granting
it an exclusive monopoly franchise.53 The Ninth Circuit held that if Los
Angeles' public utility facilities could physically accommodate more than
one cable system, the City could not limit access to a single CTV
franchise consistent with the first amendment.54 The court, therefore,
reversed the district court's dismissal of Preferred's first amendment
claim. "
A critical part of the Preferred I opinion focused on the single
franchise policy as a means which government could use to regulate the
content of cable broadcasting. The granting of a monopoly franchise cre-
ated "a serious risk that city officials will discriminate among cable prov-
iders on the basis of the content of, or the views expressed in, their
proposed programs."5 6 The Preferred I court further stated that there
was too great a risk that diversity in editorial judgments would be limited
by Los Angeles' determination of which cable providers would be per-
mitted to use the medium. The court believed that the possibility of
content-based discrimination over editorial aspects of free speech justified
dismantling of the single franchise process.
In City of Los Angeles v. Preferred Communications,8 ("Preferred
II"), the United States Supreme Court agreed to hear the single
franchise issue. The Court was presented with a case of first impression:
whether municipal regulations which allow only one CTV company ac-
cess to cities are in violation of the first amendment. The Court realized
that CTV broadcasting implicated some amount of first amendment pro-
tection,59 because of its similarity to the traditional enterprises of speech
51. Id. at 975-76.
52. 754 F.2d 1396 (9th Cir. 1985).
53. Id. at 1402.
54. Id. at 1411.
55. Id. at 1415.
56. Preferred 1, 754 F.2d at 1406.
57. Id. at 1406-07.
58. 476 U.S. 488 (1986).
59. Id. at 494.
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and communication of ideas, like newspapers, book publishers, public
speakers and pamphleteers. The Court also stated, however, that CTV
implicated first amendment interests similar to those of wireless broad-
casters in the fields of radio and television communication.'
One of Los Angeles' arguments was that "the process of installation
and repair of such a [CTV] system in effect subjects City facilities
designed for other purposes to a servitude which will cause traffic delays
and hazards and [a]esthetic unsightliness."6 In order to address this as-
sertion and therefore articulate the appropriate constitutional standard,
the Court needed more fact-specific information. The case was re-
manded for a determination of the present uses of Los Angeles' public
utility poles and rights-of-way and how Preferred proposed to install and
maintain CTV facilities on them.62
By failing to determine whether the single franchise policy was con-
stitutional, the Court left the CTV industry and lower courts in a precari-
ous position. CTV companies are now faced with the prospect of having
to bring lawsuits in order to gain access to municipalities which have
single franchise policies. As was seen in the Group W opinion, despite
the Preferred decisions, lower courts have no clear precedent to follow in
determining the constitutionality of the single franchise policy. Without
guidance from the Supreme Court, lower courts have been forced to for-
mulate their own first amendment standard regarding the relatively new
medium of cable communication. The Group W court faced this
challenge.
V. THE PosT-Preferred Era
The confusion facing the Group W court and other lower courts af-
ter the Preferred decisions involves two factors. The first factor was dis-
cussed in Preferred : whether cities will grant CTV franchises based
upon the content of programming, rather than objective qualifications
(i.e., whether the CTV company can provide the entire city with service,
has state-of-the-art equipment and the financial capability to install and
maintain a new system). The second factor was discussed in Preferred I.
whether, if two or more CTV companies are given franchises, the disrup-
tion caused during installation would give rise to a substantial interest
justifying a single franchise regulation.
The Preferred I court recognized that municipal authorities can dis-
60. Id.
61. Id. at 493.
62. Id. at 495.
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guise content-based restrictions behind a single franchise policy. For ex-
ample, the CTV company which offered family shows or programs
preferred by local politicians would receive the single franchise. A logi-
cal extension of this argument is that franchising authorities may be in-
fluenced into granting franchises to those CTV companies offering better
fringe benefits, like political campaign contributions.
Indeed, in Pacific West Cable Co. v. City of Sacramento,63 a case
involving the same franchising issues as the Preferred decisions and
the Group W case, the jury found that in awarding CTV franchises
Sacramento officials were motivated by more than the applicants' objec-
tive qualifications.'M In Pacific West, the jury found that Sacramento
"used cable television's allegedly monopolistic nature as a pretext to
obtain cash payments, in-kind services and increased campaign
contributions."
65
The second factor facing the Group W court after the Preferred deci-
sions was whether the installation of more than one CTV system will
cause undue physical disruption to the public domain. In Preferred II,
the Supreme Court remanded the case for more factual development of
the proposed uses of utility poles and rights-of-way in Los Angeles.
When the issue again reaches the Supreme Court, therefore, the alleged
interest in preventing undue physical disruption may prove decisive in
the Court's decision.
VI. ANALYSIS OF SANTA CRuz's ASSERTED GOVERNMENTAL
INTERESTS
The Group W court saw the single franchise policy as a content-
neutral regulation and therefore applied the O'Brien test. The Supreme
Court in O'Brien stated that "when 'speech' and 'nonspeech' elements
are combined in the same course of conduct, a sufficiently important gov-
ernmental interest in regulating the nonspeech element can justify inci-
dental limitations of First Amendment freedoms."66 When the issue of
CTV franchising again reaches the Supreme Court, assuming the O'Brien
test is adopted, the Court will have to analyze cities' alleged governmen-
tal interests to determine whether they have the sufficient quantum of
importance necessary to abridge first amendment freedoms. Upon a
closer inspection of Santa Cruz's purported governmental interests, the
63. 672 F. Supp. 1322 (E.D. Cal. 1987).
64. Id. at 1338.
65. Id.
66. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968).
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sufficient quantum of importance necessary to abridge first amendment
rights is clearly missing.
A. Natural Monopoly
The Group W court analyzed and rejected the argument that be-
cause CTV is a natural monopoly, a substantial government interest ex-
isted in granting only one CTV franchise. The Group W court should
have recognized that neither the court, nor Santa Cruz, had the ability to
decide whether an industry was a natural monopoly. Deciding that CTV
is a natural monopoly is not a task that politicians (local franchising au-
thorities) are equipped to handle either. Experienced cable operators are
in a far better position to assess the risks and rewards of operating com-
peting municipal CTV franchises.67
Decisions not to compete in the CTV market "stem from the con-
clusions that, as a business matter, survival in a particular competitive
environment is uncertain or that, because of limited space on existing
poles or conduits, the cost of building a new system is such that the in-
vestment is deemed unsound."6 Making these types of economic deci-
sions is no different than the decisions that might inhibit the start of any
economic venture, including a newspaper.69 If the situation should de-
velop that too many CTV operators are competing for the same subscrib-
ers, the economic marketplace will bear out the CTV operator chosen by
consumers, and not politicians. Government regulation over the selec-
tion of a community's CTV operator is no more justified than selection of
the newspaper publisher.70
While a CTV operator may think twice about spending excessive
money to enter a new market, the current operator will not easily give
potential competitors cause to enter its market.71 The incumbent CTV
operator will have greater economic incentive to keep its customers satis-
fied, because of its fear of losing market share. If an operator has a gov-
ernment protected monopoly, it has little economic incentive to keep
67. Hazlett, Private Monopoly and the Public Interest: An Economic Analysis of the Cable
Television Franchise, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1335, 1351 (1986). "To argue that self-interested
business persons, risking their own dollars and reputations, are less able to recognize ruinous
competition than city council members who do not directly realize any profit or loss is a curi-
ous economic theory, indeed." Id. at 1351.
68. G. SHAPIRO, P. KURLAND, J. MERCURIO, CABLESPEECH, THE CASE FOR FIRST
AMENDMENT PROTECTION 196 (1987).
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Hazlett, Private Monopoly and the Public Interest: An Economic Analysis of the Cable
Television Franchise, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1335, 1376 (1986).
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its system state-of-the-art and provide viewers with the best possible
service.7"
For example, in Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC,73 ("Quincy") the
court found that new CTV systems can offer up to 200 channels.74 Cur-
rently, operational systems may carry fewer channels, ranging from
twelve to thirty-six.75 If an existing CTV system carries only thirty-six
channels and is a monopoly franchise, it probably will fail to improve its
channel capacity because competitive economic pressures which nor-
mally would force it to do so will be absent. Customers of these older
systems, therefore, will not receive the same quality of service that newer
systems can offer.
Advancing technologies like pay-per-view 76 may also be affected by
the existence of monopoly franchises. If existing operators do not feel
economic pressure to bring their systems up to the state-of-art, pay-per-
view and other emerging technologies will not be widely available to con-
sumers and their future growth will be stifled. A monopolist hurts con-
sumers because the free market forces will not affect entrenched
operators and force them to provide the most technologically advanced
equipment.
B. Physical Scarcity
The Group W court also rejected Santa Cruz's assertion that physi-
cal scarcity of space prevented the City from accepting more than one
CTV franchise. 77 The court, however, did not deny that a valid govern-
mental interest in preventing access to more than one CTV company
could exist if physical space on utility poles and under streets could not
accommodate all who wished to broadcast.
The physical scarcity interest is closely related to the natural mo-
nopoly interest. Although CTV is not a natural monopoly, a municipal
market cannot financially support an unlimited number of franchisees. If
operating competing CTV franchises proves uneconomic in some cities
72. "While municipalities emphasize the costs of overbuilding, they fail to perceive that
such costs make established firms very dedicated to the preservation of their financially viable
market by not inviting entry." Id.
73. 768 F.2d 1434 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
74. Id. at 1439 n.8.
75. Id. at 1439.
76. Pay-per-view is a newer service offered to households which receive basic cable service.
Pay-per-view offers special sports programming or pre-selected movies to those people who
notify the provider in advance that they want to see the featured programming. Payment is
incurred on an as-view basis (pay-per-view), rather than on a monthly charge with conven-
tional movie channels like HBO or Showtime.
77. Group W, 669 F. Supp. 954, 964 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
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or is perceived as being uneconomic in others, this possibility will serve
to regulate the number of entrants without the need for a single franchise
policy.78 An example of this was seen in Group W, where only two of
four franchise applicants sought competing franchises in Santa Cruz.
The other applicants were unwilling to risk the capital investment neces-
sary to build competing franchises.
Assuming a city can support a reasonable number of franchises, it
probably will not face overwhelming numbers of prospective operators.
It should be possible for a city to accommodate those few CTV operators
who are willing to operate non-exclusive franchises. The economics of
operating competing CTV systems will deter many new companies from
seeking franchises in municipalities which already have existing service.
C Physical Disruption
Santa Cruz's final argument supporting the single franchise policy
was that it had a substantial governmental interest in preventing the un-
due disruption that would result if two or more CTV companies were
installing systems in the City. The Group W court recognized that
protection against physical disruption in Santa Cruz justified some
amount of governmental regulation. The court stated that Santa Cruz
had "legitimate interests in public safety and in maintaining public thor-
oughfares, '79 but that the real issue was whether the public safety con-
cerns "provide a sufficient justification for the granting of a monopoly
franchise."8 The court, therefore, seemed to look at whether the poten-
tial for public disruption rose to the level necessary to justify impinge-
ment on first amendment rights. Since Santa Cruz was willing to endure
the disruption of Group W dismantling its existing system while a second
company installed a new system, the court held it failed to show that
there would be undue disruption if two companies built up simul-
taneously.
In Preferred II, because the Court remanded the case for more fac-
tual development of Preferred's proposed uses of municipal utility poles
and rights-of-way, it seems the Court was most concerned with Los An-
geles' alleged interest in protecting the public against undue disruption.
When the Supreme Court again reviews whether the single franchise pol-
icy is constitutional, it may view the prevention of physical disruption as
an important governmental interest under O'Brien and thus validate the
78. Hazlett, Private Monopoly and the Public Trust: An Economic Analysis of the Cable
Television Franchise, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1335 (1986).
79. Group W, 669 F. Supp. at 966.
80. Id.
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single franchise regulation. The Court, however, may view the preven-
tion of physical disruption as only a valid or legitimate interest and there-
fore not a sufficient justification for a single franchise regulation. In any
event, this interest may prove paramount to the Court's decision.
VII. RECOMMENDATION
Standing alone, a local government's interest in preventing danger-
ous or disruptive uses to public streets and rights-of-way should normally
be viewed as a substantial or important government interest. As was
seen in Group W and in the Preferred decisions, the physical disruption
interest is speculative and unproven. CTV operators can assert, there-
fore, that the governmental interest of protecting against physical disrup-
tion does not rise to the level of importance necessary to curtail first
amendment freedoms.
The speculative nature of the physical disruption interest coupled
with the fact that there are viable and equally effective alternatives cities
can use to protect against it, should give CTV broadcasters' first amend-
ment interests more weight than the interests of municipal governments.
The interest in preventing undue public disruption, therefore, should not
be viewed as important or substantial, but rather only as valid or legiti-
mate. A valid governmental interest should not rise to the level neces-
sary for justifying the denial of first amendment rights. Support for this
is found in Quincy, where the court stated: "[W]e cannot agree that...
the mere fact that cable operators require use of a public right of way-
typically utility poles-somehow justifies lesser First Amendment
scrutiny.""1
Regulation over how CTV systems are built should be a substantial
and important governmental interest. Under a local government's health
and safety powers, it should have the authority to regulate the method of
CTV installation as a means to minimize public disruption. As the
Quincy court recognized, "[tlhe potential for disruption inherent in
stringing coaxial cables above city streets may well warrant some govern-
ment regulation of the process of installing and maintaining the cable sys-
tem. "82 The power to regulate the process of installation, however,
should not extend to deny that installation by more than one company
can take place at all.
The answer to CTV franchising lies with local governments' regula-
tion of the CTV installation process. The Supreme Court can solve the
81. Quincy, 768 F.2d at 1449.
82. Id. (emphasis added).
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problem raised in Preferred 1, concerning the possibility of content-based
restrictions inherent in a single franchise policy, and also address the
physical disruption interest explored in Preferred I by allowing cities to
regulate the manner in which CTV systems are built. This can be done
with time, place and manner regulations.
A. Time, Place and Manner Regulations
Time, place and manner regulations are stated in terms of a three-
part test. A court should uphold time, place and manner restrictions as
long as the restrictions are "content neutral, are narrowly tailored to
serve a significant government interest, and leave open ample alternative
channels of communication." 3 An example of a time, place and manner
restriction was illustrated by the court in Pacific West Cable. 84 The court
suggested a city may regulate CTV installation by restricting the inter-
vals at which CTV systems are installed, such as allowing access to un-
derground utility conduits every few years.85
A compromise can thus be worked between cities and CTV opera-
tors so that the interests of both sides are met. Cities can protect their
interests and at the same time afford CTV companies their first amend-
ment rights by regulating the installation process of a CTV system. A
city may require that the building take place in the late hours of the night
or perhaps only on weekends. A city can also require that cable wire be
manufactured in the same color as the utility poles to which it is at-
tached. The cable will blend in visually with the poles and prevent
blight.
Furthermore, if two or more CTV companies seek concurrent access
to a city, they should be required to build up simultaneously to minimize
the amount of public disruption. Indeed, forcing CTV operators to build
competing systems at the same time will make it more economical for all
involved. The cost of digging up streets or erecting new poles can be
spread equally among those currently installing systems and will also
avoid costly duplication of effort. As the Group W court recognized,
Santa Cruz was willing to endure the undue disruption of Group W dis-
mantling its existing CTV system while a new company's system was
built. There would be much less disruption if the incumbent operator is
allowed to remain and only the new entrant impacts the public while
,building a new system.
83. United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171 (1983) (quoting Perry Educ. Ass'n v. Perry Local
Educators Ass'n 460 U.S. 37 (1983)).
84. 672 F. Supp. 1322, 1332 n.lI (E.D. Cal. 1987).
85. Id.
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VIII. CONCLUSION
Although the single franchise policy is supposed to protect impor-
tant government interests, it also affects "values that lie near the heart of
the First Amendment." 86 The purpose of the first amendment is "to pre-
serve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth will ultimately
prevail."87 Thus, the possibility that city authorities may be corrupted
by campaign contributions or other extrinsic factors when deciding
which CTV company will receive a city's single franchise is disheartening
to first amendment freedoms.
The nature of cities' interests can be promoted through means more
protective of the first amendment. Although the Supreme Court has re-
cently narrowed the content-neutral tests of O'Brien and time, place and
manner by giving greater discretion to the states,88 in the CTV context,
operators should be afforded greater free speech rights. Without the abil-
ity for CTV operators to lay cable, they are completely foreclosed from
speaking and left without alternative forums in which to speak.
As implied by Preferred II, the only governmental interest that the
Court finds legitimate for balancing against the rights of a first amend-
ment speaker is the interest in preventing undue disruption to public
rights-of-way. This valid governmental interest can be accomplished
with much less violence to the first amendment by using time, place and
manner regulations, rather than a single franchise policy.
Eddie E. Blau
86. Quincy, 768 F.2d at 1453.
87. Pacific West, 672 F. Supp. at 1334.
88. In United States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675 (1985), the Court stated that an incidental
burden on speech is permissible under O'Brien "so long as the neutral regulation promotes a
substantial government interest that would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation."
Id. at 689. In Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 58 U.S.L.W. 3146 (Aug. 30, 1989), the Court
stated that a time, place or manner regulation must be narrowly tailored to serve legitimate
governmental interests, "but that it need not be the least-restrictive or least-intrusive means of
doing so." Id. at 15. The Ward Court continued from Albertini where the Court stated that
narrow tailoring is satisfied "so long as the ... regulation promotes a substantial government
interest that would be achieved less effectively absent the regulation." Albertini, 472 U.S. at
689.
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